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BECKER, Chief Judge.* 
 
This appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor 
of antitrust defendants presents a familiar pattern. A dealer 
irritates his competitors and their principal supplier 
through his aggressive price discounting practices. The 
other dealers complain to the supplier, who, to placate the 
aggrieved dealers, agrees not to sell any product to the 
dealer. The "boycotted" dealer then brings a Sherman Act 
suit, 15 U.S.C. S 1 et seq., in federal court. The alleged 
conspiracy involves a number of the plaintiff's competitors, 
and the refusal to deal is said to have become a group 
boycott, which can be a horizontal antitrust violation with 
per se antitrust implications; the supplier, notwithstanding 
its vertical relation to the plaintiff, is said to have become 
a co-conspirator. 
 
The present case arose out of the rough and tumble 
roofing and siding materials distribution business in 
northern New Jersey, where several favored roofing and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
* Honorable Edward R. Becker, United States Circuit Judge for the Third 
Circuit, assumed Chief Judge status on February 1, 1998. 
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siding distributors were concerned that the entrance of a 
new price cutting competitor could destabilize the market 
and substantially cut into their profit margins. The 
principal players in this drama are plaintiffs Joseph Rossi, 
and his two successive roofing and siding distribution 
businesses, Rossi Florence Corp. ("Rossi Florence"), and 
Rossi Roofing, Inc. ("Rossi Roofing"); defendants Standard 
Roofing, Inc., ("Standard") and Arzee Supply Corporation 
("Arzee"), two of Rossi's chief competitors, and several of 
their key officers; and defendant GAF Corporation ("GAF"), 
the manufacturer that supplied the most important product 
in the market. Minor roles were played by defendants Wood 
Fiber Industries, Inc. ("Wood Fiber"), another roofing and 
siding manufacturer, and Servistar Corp. ("Servistar"), a 
national purchasing cooperative and reseller of roofing and 
siding products. 
 
Following discovery, the district court granted summary 
judgment for all defendants on the ground that plaintiffs 
had failed to adduce sufficient evidence to meet the 
demanding standard of proof in the antitrust context 
established by the Supreme Court's jurisprudence. The 
court also relied on plaintiffs' alleged failure to demonstrate 
causation and damages. While we agree with the district 
court that Rossi cannot survive summary judgment as to 
Servistar and Wood Fiber, we believe that the record is 
sufficient to enable Rossi to survive summary judgment on 
the antitrust claims as to Standard, Arzee, the individual 
defendants associated with those firms, and GAF. 
 
The Supreme Court's jurisprudence in the area of 
concerted refusals to deal teaches that not every situation 
in which a distributor is cut off at the behest of his 
competitors constitutes a group boycott entitled to per se 
treatment. Otherwise, legitimate efforts by manufacturers to 
impose reasonable rules limiting intra-brand competition 
would be outlawed and the beneficial effects such actions 
have on inter-brand competition would be lost. Moreover, 
the distinction between vertical and horizontal restraints 
would blur. These concerns, however, are not implicated 
here, in view of both the price-related orientation of the 
alleged offending conduct of the key defendants and the 
sheer scope and draconian modus operandi of the alleged 
conspiracy. 
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The jurisprudence also renders it difficult for an antitrust 
plaintiff to prove that the manufacturer and distributors 
conspired, typically because it is difficult for the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that what the manufacturer or supplier did 
was inconsistent with independent action or that the 
claimed conspiracy makes economic sense. In this case, 
however, at least at the summary judgment stage, that 
burden is surmounted by the presence of certain direct 
evidence of conspiracy as well as: (1) evidence that GAF 
acted against its consistent policy (and hence ostensibly 
against its own interest) in refusing to sell (and seeing to it 
that others did not sell) GAF products to Rossi; (2) evidence 
of pretext in connection with GAF 's efforts to explain away 
the foregoing; (3) evidence that the major suppliers had 
sufficient leverage over GAF to induce it to so act; and (4) 
the quite graphic and extensive nature of the statements 
and actions of various defendants directed towards 
eliminating Rossi as a price-cutting competitor who passed 
secret rebates onto his customers and thereby threatened 
to de-stabilize the market. We also discern genuine issues 
of material fact on causation and damages, and this too 
precludes summary judgment on the antitrust claims 
against the key defendants. 
 
Although the district court's order granting summary 
judgment on the antitrust claims regarding GAF, Standard, 
Arzee, and their corporate officers must be reversed, it 
must be affirmed as to Servistar and Wood Fiber, since 
Rossi has failed to overcome his burden of showing that 
either Servistar's or Wood Fiber's actions tended to exclude 
the possibility of independent action on their part. More 
specifically, Rossi has failed to put forth any evidence of 
Servistar's motive to conspire; as we shall explain, 
Servistar's relationship to GAF was far different from that of 
the distributor defendants. Rossi has also failed to show 
that the other defendants had any leverage over Servistar 
with which they could have coerced it to join the 
conspiracy. With respect to Wood Fiber, the only evidence 
Rossi has been able to adduce is that Wood Fiber may, on 
one or two occasions, have responded to pressure and 
threats from Standard and Arzee by not selling to Rossi, 
and hence this record is insufficient to satisfy the 
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standards for proving concerted action as delineated by the 
Supreme Court. 
 
Rossi also pressed a tortious interference claim under 
New Jersey state law. The district court granted summary 
judgment for all defendants on this claim without any 
discussion. This aspect of the judgment must be set aside 
because it violates our rule requiring that district courts 
accompany grants of summary judgment with an 
explanation sufficient to permit the parties and this court 
to understand the legal basis for the court's order. See 
Vadino v. A. Valey Eng'rs, 903 F.2d 253, 257-60 (3d Cir. 
1990). 
 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
The following background facts, which describe the basic 
framework and background within which this case arises, 
are set forth in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party as is required when considering a motion for 
summary judgment. The remainder of Rossi's evidence, 
most of which deals specifically with the existence vel non 
of concerted action by the defendants, will be detailed in 
S II.B.2, infra, after we have explained the appropriate legal 
standards. 
 
A. The Parties 
 
The plaintiffs, in addition to Joseph Rossi, are Rossi 
Florence and Rossi Roofing.1 Rossi has been in the roofing 
and siding distribution business in northern New Jersey 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Defendants contend that Joseph Rossi lacks standing as an individual 
to pursue this matter against them because his personal claims of injury 
are derivative of the claims of Rossi Florence and Rossi Roofing. The 
district court did not reach that issue because it found that no antitrust 
violation existed at all. See Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 958 F. 
Supp. 
976, 991 n.11 (D.N.J. 1997). Since we are reversing the district court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of several of the defendants and 
remanding this case for further proceedings, we will also remand the 
standing issue so that the district court can consider it in the first 
instance. Because we are not then differentiating between plaintiffs for 
the purposes of this appeal, we will assume that all three plaintiffs have 
standing, and will generally use the term "Rossi" to refer to them all. 
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since 1972. Rossi Florence and Rossi Roofing were roofing 
and siding distribution companies formed by Rossi at the 
end of 1988 and the beginning of 1989. Both are now out 
of business. This suit was brought against a number of 
Rossi's competitors (as well as several individuals 
associated with them), several roofing and siding 
manufacturers, and one national purchasing cooperative. 
Several of the original defendants, Allied Roofing, Inc. 
("Allied"), Nailite Corp. ("Nailite"), Certainteed Corp. 
("Certainteed"), and Wolverine Technologies Corp. 
("Wolverine") have settled with Rossi and were dismissed 
from the case. The remaining defendants are: Standard, 
Arzee, GAF, Wood Fiber, Servistar, the estate of Robert 
Higginson (hereinafter "Robert Higginson"), William 
Higginson, Joseph Licciardello, Alvin Roth, and Cary Roth. 
 
Standard and Arzee are distributors of roofing and siding 
products in northern New Jersey. Like Rossi Roofing, they 
purchase products from manufacturers and resell them to 
contractors and applicators in large volume. Standard is 
headquartered in Tinton Falls, New Jersey and has seven 
branch locations, including five in New Jersey, one in 
Pennsylvania, and one in Connecticut. Robert Higginson 
was the founder and chairman of Standard. William 
Higginson, Robert's son, is a shareholder and the current 
president of Standard. Arzee is a family-owned distributor 
with one of its branches located adjacent to Standard in 
Cedar Knolls. Defendant Alvin Roth is a shareholder and 
the president of Arzee, and defendant Cary Roth is Alvin's 
son and one of Arzee's branch managers. 
 
GAF and Wood Fiber manufacture and supply roofing 
products to distributors like Rossi Roofing, Standard, and 
Arzee. GAF and Wood Fiber are two of the 37 roofing 
product manufacturers that serve the northern New Jersey 
market. GAF manufactures and sells its roofing material 
("GAF product") to most, but not all, of the distributors 
located in northern New Jersey. GAF sold to Standard, 
Arzee, and Allied, but refused to sell to Rossi. Joseph 
Licciardello was an employee of GAF, who quit his job and 
replaced Rossi as vice president of Standard after Rossi was 
fired.2 Wood Fiber competes with GAF in the northern New 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Section I.B, infra, provides further information about Rossi's career 
at 
Standard. 
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Jersey market, manufacturing and selling Structodek FS, a 
product used principally in commercial roofing 
applications. 
 
Defendant Servistar is a member-owned, national 
purchasing cooperative that operates hardware distribution 
centers nationwide. Servistar has over 4000 members at 
the retail level and deals primarily in paint, hardware, 
plumbing and electrical supplies, housewares, lawn and 
garden equipment, power tools, and lumber. Roofing 
products account for only 2% of Servistar's total purchases 
on behalf of its members, which were just under $1 billion 
in 1990. Servistar does not warehouse roofing supplies, but 
rather operates on a "drop shipment" basis, meaning that 
members place their orders through Servistar (which 
affords them a discount based on Servistar's status as a 
national volume purchaser), and the selected roofing 
manufacturer then supplies the product directly to the 
member. Servistar pays the manufacturer and later collects 
from the member. 
 
B. Rossi at Standard; Rossi Forms His Own Company 
 
From 1972 to 1988, Rossi worked for defendant Standard 
as the manager of its Cedar Knolls, New Jersey branch, 
selling roofing and siding materials. In 1980, Rossi was 
promoted to vice president, rewarded with stock in the 
company, and told that he would eventually become a co- 
owner of the business. Eight years later, however, in 
September 1988, Standard fired Rossi. The parties dispute 
the reasons for Rossi's discharge. Rossi alleges that 
Standard fired him because he refused to participate in a 
conspiracy with defendant Arzee to fix prices, discussed 
infra at S II.B.2.a. Standard claims that it fired Rossi for a 
combination of reasons including his deteriorating work 
performance, his failure to control expenses, the Cedar 
Knolls branch's excessively high payroll expenses under his 
management, his large personal expense account, his 
failure to arrive at work until late morning, his 
concentration on outside business ventures to the 
detriment of Standard, and, ultimately, his failure to 
achieve branch profits commensurate with branch sales. 
 
At all events, by the time he was fired, Rossi had 
developed a reputation within the industry for extremely 
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competitive pricing, excellent service, and reliability. While 
at Standard, Rossi had refined an aggressive marketing 
strategy that stressed high volume sales at low prices. This 
strategy, as one might imagine, angered Rossi's competitors 
and even concerned some of his suppliers, which were 
sensitive to their distributors concerns about pricing. 
 
After his termination, Rossi decided to use his 
connections within the industry to open his own roofing 
and siding distributorship that would serve northern New 
Jersey in direct competition with Standard and Arzee. 
Rossi's first attempt, in late 1988, was Rossi Florence, a 
joint venture with Richard Droesch ("Droesch"), president of 
Florence Corp. ("Florence"), a roofing, siding, and window 
distributor in Long Island, New York. Rossi and Droesch 
planned to operate their new business out of a warehouse 
Rossi owned at 8 Frederick Place, located immediately 
adjacent to Standard's Cedar Knolls/Morristown branch 
and just down the street from Arzee's Morristown branch. 
Rossi and Droesch made substantial preparations for their 
venture during the fall of 1988. Droesch (together with one 
of his employees) invested $100,000 in Rossi Florence, and 
Rossi Florence obtained a $900,000 bank line of credit 
secured by the principals' personal guarantees. By mid- 
January 1989, however, Droesch decided to pull out of 
Rossi Florence, and Rossi refunded his investment. Droesch 
felt that because of pressure from Standard, Arzee, and 
others, the new company would be unable to get the 
products it needed to successfully compete in the market. 
In addition, Alvin Roth, president of Arzee, threatened 
Droesch that if he continued in business with Rossi in New 
Jersey, Arzee would open up a branch in Long Island to 
compete directly with Droesch's Florence distributorship. 
 
Thereafter, in February 1989, Rossi incorporated Rossi 
Roofing, continuing his efforts to break into the roofing and 
siding distribution business in northern New Jersey. Rossi 
Roofing obtained another $900,000 bank line of credit, 
personally guaranteed by Rossi and his wife. The company, 
which opened for business on March 20, 1989, closed in 
less than a year, after experiencing great difficulty in 
obtaining product lines and weathering the brunt of a 
major downturn in the New Jersey housing industry. In 
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January 1990, unable to run Rossi Roofing profitably, Rossi 
sold the company's assets to American Builders and 
Contractors, Inc. ("ABC"), a national roofing and siding 
distributor. 
 
C. The Roofing and Siding Industry in Northern New 
   Jersey; Price Discounting and Market Shares 
 
During the relevant time period, the northern New Jersey 
market included thirty-nine roofing distributors with more 
than fifty-seven locations. Eleven residential roofing 
manufacturers, nine commercial roofing manufacturers, 
and seventeen vinyl siding manufacturers operated in the 
region. It is undisputed that this roofing and siding 
marketplace was highly competitive, and that roofing and 
siding contractors constantly price-shopped, pitting 
distributor against distributor in order to obtain the best 
possible deal. 
 
GAF, which served this region, offered certain favored 
distributors secret off-invoice, volume and non-volume 
discounts or "rebates" in the form of periodic credits 
against purchases. Standard, Arzee, and former defendant 
Allied purportedly all received such discounts from GAF. 
The amount of these discounts was kept highly confidential 
because the favored distributors feared that if other 
distributors found out, they might complain to GAF and 
ultimately destabilize prices in the market. As GAF district 
sales manager Elmer "Bud" Krusa put it, "the less people 
that know about it, the less chance you have of getting it -- 
dropping the entire market price." Rossi contends that 
while he was employed at Standard, he would pass these 
discounts on to his customers in an effort to increase his 
market share, whereas his competitors typically pocketed 
the rebate. 
 
GAF and Wood Fiber are the only two manufacturers 
remaining as litigants in this case. According to GAF 's own 
estimates, it supplied a large percentage of the New Jersey 
shingle market (38% for all shingles and 71% for laminate 
shingles). GAF was Standard's primary supplier of roofing 
products in the 1980's, and Standard was GAF 's biggest 
customer in New Jersey and one of its top five customers in 
the entire country. Standard bought $7.7 million of GAF 
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product in 1989 (or 32% of GAF 's total sales in New Jersey 
that year), substantially more than any other GAF customer 
in New Jersey. 
 
Arzee and former defendant Allied also purchased GAF 
product, but in markedly smaller quantities. Arzee, for 
example, featured Tamko and Owens Corning Roofing, 
rather than GAF product, and only purchased $919,747 of 
GAF product in 1989 (or 4% of GAF's total sales in New 
Jersey in 1989). Together, however, Standard, Arzee, and 
Allied (which bought $2.1 million of GAF product in 1989) 
purchased $10.7 million of the $24.1 million of GAF 
product sold in New Jersey (or 44% of GAF 's total sales in 
New Jersey in 1989).3 Rossi contends that, notwithstanding 
the large number of other manufacturers offering product 
in the area, GAF product was critical for a distributor to 
successfully compete in Northern New Jersey, as evidenced 
by GAF's large market share and also the fact that it was 
the most desirable and popular roofing material available. 
This in turn stems in part from several facts: GAF product 
was well-known by both homeowners and contractors; GAF 
guaranteed its product; and importantly, GAF product had 
already been selected for many of the existing townhouse 
projects in northern New Jersey in 1989 and 1990, making 
it impossible for the builders to switch brands mid-stream. 
 
The evidence in the record regarding Wood Fiber's market 
position in 1989-90 is not as clearly defined as that of GAF. 
Wood Fiber manufactures Structodek FS, a commercial 
roofing product used primarily in commercial applications 
for certain modified bitumen roofs. Commercial work 
comprised no more than a third of Rossi Roofing's 
business; the remaining two-thirds consisted of residential 
roofing. We do not know from the record how much product 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. 1989 sales of GAF product in the northern New Jersey market 
(rounded to the nearest $100,000) were: 
 
       Company        Amount               % of Total Sales 
 
       Standard       $ 7,700,000          32.0% 
       Allied         $ 2,100,000           8.7% 
       Arzee          $  900,000            3.8% 
 
       Total          $10,700,000          44.5% 
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Wood Fiber sold in the northern New Jersey market; nor do 
we know what percentage of Wood Fiber's sales was 
purchased by Standard or Arzee (or Allied); nor is there any 
evidence that Wood Fiber had an off-invoice rebate program 
favoring certain distributors similar to GAF's. This is not 
surprising because Wood Fiber's involvement in this case 
stems largely from two isolated episodes, one in which a 
Wood Fiber representative complained of "pressure" not to 
sell to Rossi Roofing, and another in which Wood Fiber 
refused to supply product to Rossi after having accepted an 
order. See infra S II.B.2.d. 
 
D. Rossi's Damage Claims 
 
Rossi submits that because of his inability to purchase 
"GAF and other essential products, Rossi Roofing could not 
succeed." Unable to sustain the business any longer, on 
January 8, 1990, Rossi entered into an asset purchase 
agreement with ABC, which leased Rossi's 8 East Frederick 
Place property and opened a branch where Rossi Roofing 
once stood. Most employees, including Rossi as the branch 
manager, continued to work for ABC. According to Rossi, 
ABC (which was able to get GAF and other products) did 
very well. In 1990, it achieved over $5.5 million in sales, 
and by 1993, sales had increased to $11 million.4 In 1993, 
ABC fired Rossi, closed the Morristown branch, and 
transferred operations to Randolph, New Jersey. Rossi then 
entered into a similar agreement with Allied, which opened 
up a location on Rossi's property and hired him to manage 
it. 
 
Rossi contends that he suffered substantial damages 
when Rossi Florence and Rossi Roofing, unable to get GAF 
and other important products, failed. In support, Rossi 
offers the testimony of several of his former customers 
during his tenure at Standard, who stated that they would 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. There is little evidence as to what the net profits (or losses) of the 
ABC 
branch were. Arzee contends, based upon some nebulous testimony in 
the record, that the ABC branch run by Rossi suffered losses in each of 
its four years of operation, app. at 4253-56, and that the Morristown 
branch of ABC was a failure, generating only $5 million in revenues in 
1990, $1.7 million less than Rossi's own break-evenfigure for Rossi 
Roofing. App. at 4309-10. 
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have done business with Rossi Roofing if it had had the 
necessary product lines. Thus, in Rossi's submission, if the 
manufacturers had sold to him the same products that 
they ultimately sold to ABC (and later Allied), Rossi Roofing 
would have succeeded, and "over time, Rossi would have 
had his company open up new branches, as Standard, 
Arzee and Allied have done. The lost profits to Rossi 
Florence, and to Rossi Roofing, have been over $7 million at 
a minimum." In addition, Rossi claims to have suffered 
additional, non-duplicative damages of over $1 million from 
payments he made on behalf of Rossi Florence and Rossi 
Roofing, including payments made on his personal 
guarantees of Rossi Roofing's debts. 
 
E. Procedural History 
 
Rossi's action in the district court alleged, inter alia, a 
group boycott in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
15 U.S.C. S 1, and Section 3 of the New Jersey Antitrust 
Act, as well as tortious interference with plaintiffs' 
contractual and prospective contractual relations.5 After 
extensive discovery and submissions in support of and 
opposition to the motions, the district court granted 
defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding 
insufficient evidence of concerted action, causation, and 
damages. Rossi has appealed not only that judgment but 
also a discovery ruling -- the district court's order denying 
a motion to compel defendant GAF to provide additional 
factual detail about the subject matter of GAF's counsel's 
handwritten notes of three telephone conversations with 
GAF employees. 
 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1337 and 1367, as well as 15 
U.S.C. S 15. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. State law claims for breach of contract, conversion, fraud, and 
negligent misrepresentation, arising out of Rossi's contractual 
relationships with Standard, were dismissed without prejudice and are 
not under review here. 
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II. SECTION 1 OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT 
 
Under the literal dictates of S 1 of the Sherman Act "every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is 
declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. 1 (emphasis supplied). The 
Supreme Court has interpreted this provision to prohibit 
only unreasonable restraints. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. 
Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988). To determine 
whether a restraint is unreasonable, courts apply one of 
two modes of analysis, depending upon the nature of the 
concerted action at issue. Agreements are either analyzed 
through "a case-by-case application of the so-called rule of 
reason," whereby the fact finder "weighs all of the 
circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive 
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable 
restraint on competition," id. (internal quotations omitted), 
or the court applies the per se standard, which dispenses 
with the need for case-by-case analysis.6  See id. Under the 
per se standard, conduct that is "manifestly 
anticompetitive" or "would always or almost always tend to 
restrict competition," id. (internal citations omitted), is 
conclusively presumed to unreasonably restrain 
competition "without elaborate inquiry as to the precise 
harm [it has] caused or the business excuse for [its] use." 
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
This is because "of [its] pernicious effect on competition and 
lack of any redeeming virtue." Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. 
at 5. Thus, the first issue we must consider is whether the 
conduct alleged here warrants per se or the more lenient 
rule of reason treatment, because that determination will 
dramatically affect the quantum of proof Rossi must offer to 
sustain his claim. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. We have also recently discussed a third standard that falls somewhere 
between the rule of reason and per se standards. In our jurisprudence, 
we refer to this middle ground as an abbreviated or"quick look" rule of 
reason analysis. See Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 
1367 n.9 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 
669 (3d Cir. 1993)). This "quick look" analysis applies "where per se 
condemnation is inappropriate, but where a full-blown industry analysis 
is not required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of an 
inherently suspect restraint." Id. 
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A. Characterizing a Group Boycott; Per se Versus the Rule 
   of Reason 
 
Rossi, relying on such cases as United States v. General 
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. 
BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1376 (3d Cir. 1992), 
Fragale & Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 F.2d 469, 473 (3d 
Cir. 1985); Malley-Duff, 734 F.2d at 140, and Edward J. 
Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 114 (3d 
Cir. 1980), alleges that the defendants engaged in a classic 
horizontal group boycott that qualifies as a per se violation. 
Rossi submits that several of his fellow distributor- 
competitors (i.e. Standard, Arzee, and Allied), as well as 
their principal manufacturer/supplier(s), agreed to boycott 
Rossi Florence and Rossi Roofing and frustrate Rossi's 
attempts to obtain the products he needed to successfully 
compete against them. 
 
Defendants respond that Rossi's theory does not 
comprise a per se antitrust claim because it is a vertical 
conspiracy in which there has been no allegation of resale 
price fixing. We agree with defendants that if this were 
simply a vertical conspiracy, between one horizontal 
competitor and one supplier or manufacturer, we would 
analyze it under the rule of reason unless there were some 
evidence of price fixing. See Business Elecs., 485 U.S. at 
735-36 (analyzing an alleged agreement between one 
supplier and one horizontal distributor as a vertical non- 
price-fixing conspiracy under the rule of reason); Tunis 
Brothers, 763 F.2d at 1497, 1502 (same); cf. Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 37, 59 (1977) 
(concluding that franchise agreements that bar retailers 
from selling franchised products from locations other than 
those specified are analyzed under the rule of reason).7 
Unlike the cases cited above, however, here there are a 
number of horizontal competitors involved. Thus, this case 
more closely resembles the horizontal nature of United 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In Business Elecs., the Supreme Court indicated that the rationale 
behind applying the rule of reason to vertical non-price restraints is 
that 
such restraints have the potential to promote inter-brand competition, 
the "primary concern of the antitrust laws," over intra-brand 
competition. See 485 U.S. at 724-25 (citations omitted). 
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States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), a case 
that the Supreme Court treated as a group boycott with per 
se implications. 
 
In General Motors, the Supreme Court found a group 
boycott where a group of automobile dealers had joined 
together to force their manufacturer, General Motors, to 
assist them in ending the practice of some dealers that 
were reselling their automobiles to discounters. See id. at 
143-44, 147. Other cases fit this mold as well. See, e.g., Big 
Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1376 (analyzing an alleged 
agreement among supplier BMW North America and several 
of its dealers to prevent a potential price-cutting competitor 
from receiving a franchise as a horizontal group boycott); 
Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 114 (holding that when a 
manufacturer terminates a distributor's supply pursuant to 
an agreement with several distributors, these actions make 
out a horizontal S 1 claim); cf. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959) (applying a similar 
horizontal analysis under S 2 of the Sherman Act where 
manufacturers and distributors had conspired among 
themselves and with a major retailer to deprive another 
retailer access to product lines). 
 
The common principle we glean from these cases is that 
a conspiracy is horizontal in nature when a number of 
competitor firms agree with each other and at least one of 
their common suppliers or manufacturers to eliminate their 
price-cutting competition by cutting his access to supplies. 
From this perspective, Rossi's asserted conspiracy is 
indistinguishable from those put forth in General Motors, 
Klor's, Big Apple BMW and Sweeney  -- namely, "joint 
action to eliminate [a] discounter[ ] from participation in the 
market," General Motors, 384 U.S. at 144-- and thus, the 
defendants' characterization of the conspiracy Rossi alleges 
as vertical, and not horizontal, cannot withstand scrutiny. 
 
This conclusion, however, leaves us with the second (and 
ultimately more difficult) question whether this horizontal 
agreement, which Rossi labels a "group boycott," qualifies 
as a per se violation. Traditionally, such agreements have 
received such per se treatment. See Malley-Duff & Assocs. 
v. Crown Life Insur. Co., 734 F.2d 133, 140 (3d Cir. 1984). 
Indeed, in all of the horizontal "group boycott" cases listed 
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above, the court adopted the per se approach. See, e.g., 
General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. at 143-44, 147; Klor's, 359 
U.S. at 212-13; Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1376; 
Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 114. More recently, however, the 
Supreme Court has reminded us that it is not a simple 
exercise to determine what conduct falls within the 
"forbidden category" of a per se group boycott. See 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & 
Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 294 (1985) (" `[T]here is more 
confusion about the scope and operation of the per se rule 
against group boycotts than in reference to any other 
aspect of the per se doctrine.' ") (quoting L. Sullivan, Law of 
Antitrust 229-30 (1977)); FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 
476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986). Under the more recent 
jurisprudence, it is clear that assigning the label "group 
boycott" to a concerted refusal to deal with a distributor 
does not have a talismanic effect, automatically bringing 
the case under the per se rubric. Instead, the Supreme 
Court has directed us to carefully scrutinize the nature of 
the asserted refusals to deal to determine whether it fits 
within the per se " `boycott' pigeonhole." Indiana Fed'n of 
Dentists, 476 U.S. at 458. 
 
In Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the Supreme Court 
attempted to explain what kinds of boycotts qualify for the 
per se approach and what kinds do not. The Court 
emphasized that the per se approach was appropriate when 
the allegations were of "joint efforts by a firm or firms to 
disadvantage competitors by either directly denying or 
persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to deny 
relationships the competitors need in the competitive 
struggle." 472 U.S. at 294 (internal quotes omitted). The 
Court also noted that per se boycott cases usually contain 
three elements: "denial of something a competitor needs to 
compete effectively, defendants with a dominant position in 
the relevant market, and the absence of any plausible 
contention that the challenged behavior would `enhance 
overall efficiency and make markets more competitive.' " P. 
Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law P 1510È (Supp. 
1997) (quoting and interpreting Northwest Wholesale 
Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294-95). Finally, the Court 
instructed that although "a concerted refusal to deal need 
not necessarily possess all of these traits to merit per se 
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treatment . . . [a] plaintiff seeking application of the per se 
rule must present a threshold case that the challenged 
activity falls into a category likely to have predominantly 
anticompetitive effects. The mere allegation of a concerted 
refusal to deal does not suffice because not all concerted 
refusals to deal are predominantly anticompetitive."8 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 295, 298. 
 
Applying these precepts to the "boycott" at issue in 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the Court determined that 
it was "not a form of concerted activity characteristically 
likely to result in predominantly anticompetitive effects." Id. 
at 295. In that case, a retail office supply store had sued a 
nonprofit cooperative buying association claiming that its 
expulsion from the cooperative was per se illegal. The 
expulsion --without explanation, notice, or hearing -- hurt 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The Courts of Appeals have differed in their application of this 
language. The Seventh Circuit has held that "once control over an 
important resource appears, no justification for a refusal to deal can be 
considered." Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law P 1510È (interpreting 
Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 541 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a 
concerted refusal to deal is illegal per se if the "defendants have either 
market power or exclusive access to an element essential to effective 
competition.") (internal quotes omitted)). The Eighth and Ninth Circuits 
have focused on the number of horizontal players in the alleged 
conspiracy and have found no per se rule against boycotts in situations 
where the conspirators included only a single supplier and a single 
retailer in competition with the plaintiff. See id. (discussing Lomar 
Wholesale Grocery, Inc. v. Dieter's Gourmet Foods, Inc., 824 F.2d 582, 
591 (8th Cir. 1987) ("there must be some collusion between competitors 
on the same market level," for otherwise the "net economic impact of 
refusals to deal" is not "immediately obvious") and Rutman Wine Co. v. 
E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1987)). The implication 
of these holdings would seem to be that the result differs as the number 
of parties to the conspiracy grows. This Court has tended to follow the 
Eighth and Ninth Circuits and has seemingly been more willing than 
some others, see, e.g., K.M.B. Warehouse Dists., Inc. v. Walker Manuf. 
Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995) (viewing an alleged agreement 
among a vertical manufacturer and three horizontal distributors as a 
vertical non-price-fixing conspiracy subject to the rule of reason, not 
per 
se, analysis), to find an horizontal per se violation when a small number 
of dealers have prevailed upon a manufacturer or supplier to cut off a 
price discounter. See, e.g., Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1376; Malley- 
Duff, 734 F.2d at 140, and Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 114. 
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the plaintiff by effectively raising the wholesale price of 
supplies and eliminating certain favorable warehousing 
options made available to members of the defendant. 
Examining this type of restraint, the Court held that "[t]he 
act of expulsion from a wholesale cooperative does not 
necessarily imply anticompetitive animus and thereby raise 
a probability of anticompetitive effect." Id. at 296 (citations 
omitted). Rather, the Court noted that cooperatives must 
"establish and enforce reasonable [membership] rules in 
order to function effectively." Id. Therefore, the rules that 
the plaintiff allegedly violated (it allegedly failed to disclose 
to the cooperative membership of a change in its 
ownership) might have been necessary for the cooperative 
to monitor its members' creditworthiness. Without a 
showing that "the cooperative possesse[d] market power or 
exclusive access to an element essential to effective 
competition," the Court held that expulsion based upon 
violation of the disclosure rules was not "likely to result in 
predominantly anticompetitive effects." Id. 
 
Similarly, in Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, the Court refused 
to extend per se group boycott status to a situation in 
which a professional association collectively refused to 
cooperate with insurers' requests for x-rays. The Court 
refused to expand the category of cases classified as per se 
group boycotts to situations involving professional 
associations or situations where "the economic impact of 
certain practices is not immediately obvious." 476 U.S. at 
459. While the collective refusal to cooperate with insurers 
"resemble[d] practices that have been labeled `group 
boycotts,' " the Court refused to hold that the economic 
impact of this agreement was immediately obvious. Id. at 
458. 
 
Here, in contrast to Indiana Fed'n of Dentists and 
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, the defendants are not 
members of a professional association, and the economic 
impact of their actions -- driving a price-cutting competitor 
out of business -- is clear. Applying the precepts laid out 
in Northwest Wholesale Stationers, we believe that the Rossi 
boycott falls within the description of "joint efforts by a firm 
or firms to disadvantage competitors by either directly 
denying or persuading or coercing suppliers or customers 
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to deny relationships the competitors need in the 
competitive struggle." 472 U.S. at 294 (internal quotes 
omitted). As will be discussed more fully below, see infra 
S II.B.2.b(1), Rossi has adduced evidence that GAF product 
was, if not unique, then at least necessary for him to 
compete in the marketplace. Further, the gravamen of his 
complaint fits snugly within the Court's Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers description of per se concerted 
refusals to deal -- namely, Standard and Arzee (and 
perhaps other horizontal competitors like Allied) conspired 
with manufacturers like GAF and suppliers like Servistar to 
deny Rossi access to GAF product as well as to coerce other 
suppliers not to sell any products to him. Importantly, all 
of this activity was done against the backdrop of Standard's 
and Arzee's dissatisfaction with Rossi's price-cutting 
proclivities, and thus an inference can be drawn that the 
conspiracy was at least partially conceived as a price 
restraint. 
 
For these reasons, we find it implausible that the alleged 
behavior by the defendants would "enhance overall 
efficiency and make markets more competitive," Northwest 
Wholesale Stationers, 472 U.S. at 294, and therefore, taking 
into account the Court's most recent guidance, we conclude 
that Rossi's allegations should be analyzed using the per se 
framework. 
 
Our conclusion that Rossi's allegations constitute a per 
se violation of S 1 simplifies our analysis here. In the usual 
rule of reason case, to establish a violation ofS 1, plaintiffs 
must prove: 
 
       (1) that the defendants contracted, combined or 
       conspired among each other; (2) that the combination 
       or conspiracy produced adverse, anti-competitive 
       effects within the relevant product and geographic 
       markets; (3) that the objects of and the conduct 
       pursuant to that contract or conspiracy were illegal; 
       and (4) that the plaintiffs were injured as a proximate 
       result of that conspiracy. 
 
Tunis Bros. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 763 F.2d 1482, 1489 
(3d Cir. 1985) (citations omitted), vacated on other grounds, 
Ford Motor Co. v. Tunis Brothers Co. Inc., 475 U.S. 1105 
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(1986). Here, because per se analysis applies, prongs two 
and three are conclusively presumed satisfied and need not 
be addressed. Accordingly, to prevail on summary 
judgment, Rossi need only show the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding concerted action and 
proximate causation. We will address these in turn. 
 
B. Concerted Action 
 
1. Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act-- Proving the 
   Conspiracy 
 
The presence of concerted action or an agreement is an 
essential element of a S 1 claim. See Copperweld Corp. v. 
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984) 
("[U]nity of purpose or a common design and 
understanding, or a meeting of the minds in an unlawful 
arrangement" must exist to trigger section 1 liability.) 
(internal quotes omitted); Alvord-Polk, Inc. v. F. Schumacher 
& Co., 37 F.3d 996, 999-1000 (1994) (noting that the 
existence of concerted action is one of the important 
distinguishing features between a S 1 claim of conspiracy 
and a S 2 claim of monopolization). Unilateral activity, no 
matter what its motivation, cannot give rise to aS 1 
violation, see Sweeney, 637 F.2d at 110-11, because a 
manufacturer "has the right to deal, or refuse to deal, with 
whomever it likes, as long as it does so independently." 
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 
(1984). A plaintiff may utilize either direct or circumstantial 
evidence in order to make out the element of concerted 
action. While direct evidence, the proverbial "smoking-gun," 
is generally the most compelling means by which a plaintiff 
can make out his or her claim, it is also frequently difficult 
for antitrust plaintiffs to come by. Thus, plaintiffs have 
been permitted to rely solely on circumstantial evidence 
(and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn 
therefrom) to prove a conspiracy. See Alvord-Polk, 37 F.3d 
at 1000 (citing Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film 
Distributing Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Sweeney, 637 F.2d 
at 111). 
 
While the traditional summary judgment standard 
applies with equal force in antitrust cases,9 when the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. A district court's grant of summary judgment is subject to plenary 
review. See Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997); 
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plaintiff relies solely on circumstantial evidence to prove 
concerted action, this analysis is modified in accordance 
with the leading antitrust cases dealing with this subject, 
Monsanto and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986), and their progeny. 
In Matsushita, the Supreme Court explained the limitation 
courts must apply to permissible inferences when deciding 
a summary judgment motion in an antitrust conspiracy 
case: "[C]onduct as consistent with permissible competition 
as with illegal conspiracy does not, standing alone, support 
an inference of antitrust conspiracy." Matsushita, 475 U.S. 
at 588 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764). Rather, to 
survive a motion for summary judgment, "a plaintiff seeking 
damages for a violation of S 1 must present evidence `that 
tends to exclude the possibility' that the alleged 
conspirators acted independently," id., "direct or 
circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Public Interest Research of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 
913 F.2d 64, 71 (3d Cir. 1990). Summary judgment "shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there 
is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An 
issue 
is genuine if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 
verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 
 
As in this case, when the nonmoving party will bear the burden of 
proof at trial, that party must adduce evidence "sufficient to establish 
the existence of [every] element essential to that party's case, and on 
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. 
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In evaluating the sufficiency of the 
evidence, facts and inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the party opposing summary judgment. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. 
Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456 (1992); Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). That 
being said, however, when the moving party has pointed to material facts 
tending to show there is no genuine issue for trial, the "opponent must 
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to 
the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not 
lead 
a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 
`genuine issue for trial.' " Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586-87 (citations 
omitted). 
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[the alleged conspirators] `had a conscious commitment to 
a common scheme designed to achieve an unlawful 
objective.' " Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 (quoting Sweeney, 
637 F.2d at 111). 
 
The Supreme Court's concerns about permitting the 
inference of a conspiracy from ambiguous circumstantial 
evidence in the antitrust context stem from its conclusion 
that mistakes by an overzealous judiciary would be 
"especially costly . . . chill[ing] the very conduct the 
antitrust laws are designed to protect." Matsushita, 475 
U.S. at 594; Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 763; Big Apple BMW, 
974 F.2d at 1363 ("Care must be taken to ensure that 
inferences of unlawful activity drawn from ambiguous 
evidence do not infringe upon defendant's freedom, so long 
as it acts independently, to refuse to deal.") (citing United 
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)). For this 
reason, the plausibility of an antitrust plaintiff's claim is 
important. "[I]f the factual context renders [the plaintiff's] 
claim implausible -- if the claim is one that simply makes 
no economic sense -- [a plaintiff] must come forward with 
more persuasive evidence to support [its] claim than would 
otherwise be necessary." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 
(citations omitted). Relatedly, in evaluating whether a 
genuine issue for trial exists, the antitrust defendants' 
economic motive is highly relevant. "[I]f[the defendants] 
had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if their 
conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible 
explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference 
of conspiracy." Id. at 596. Moreover, even with a plausible 
motive to conspire, ambiguous conduct will not create a 
triable issue of fact with respect to the existence of a 
conspiracy. See id. at 597 n.21. 
 
Under our jurisprudence, the Matsushita standard only 
applies when the plaintiff has failed to put forth direct 
evidence of conspiracy. See Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, 
Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d 
Cir. 1993). Thus, in direct evidence cases, the plaintiff need 
not adduce circumstantial evidence " `that tends to exclude 
the possibility' that the alleged conspirators acted 
independently," Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588, and there 
need not be an inquiry into the plausibility of the 
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defendants' claim or the rationality of defendants' economic 
motives. See id. at 596-97. This is because when the 
plaintiff has put forth direct evidence of conspiracy, the fact 
finder is not required to make inferences to establish facts, 
and therefore the Supreme Court's concerns over the 
reasonableness of inferences in antitrust cases evaporate. 
See Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1233. 
 
Additionally, our jurisprudence does not require the 
summary judgment opponent to " `match, item for item, 
each piece of evidence proffered by the movant,' " but rather 
he or she must only exceed the " `mere scintilla' " standard. 
See Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1230 (quoting Big Apple BMW, 
974 F.2d at 1363). Accordingly, when examining the 
sufficiency of what the plaintiff has adduced, we are not to 
"tightly compartmentalize the evidence," but rather we must 
evaluate it as a whole to see if it supports an inference of 
concerted action. See id. at 1230. 
 
In sum, Matsushita does not introduce a special burden 
on antitrust plaintiffs opposing summary judgment; it 
"demands only that the nonmoving party's inferences be 
reasonable in order to reach the jury, a requirement that 
was not invented, but merely articulated, in that decision. 
If the plaintiffs theory is economically senseless, no 
reasonable jury could find in its favor, and summary 
judgment should be granted." Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 
468-69 (footnote omitted). Conversely, Matsushita does not 
mean that antitrust defendants are entitled to summary 
judgment merely by showing that there is a plausible 
explanation for their conduct; rather "the focus must 
remain on the evidence proffered by the plaintiff and 
whether that evidence `tends to exclude the possibility that 
[the defendants] were acting independently.' " Petruzzi's, 
998 F.2d at 1232 (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764). 
Thus, where the nonmoving party has put forth evidence 
that provides an inference of concerted action, the moving 
party "bears the burden of proving that drawing the 
inference of unlawful behavior is unreasonable." Id. at 
1230. 
 
Finally, while ambiguous conduct cannot create a triable 
issue of fact, when "the alleged conduct is `facially 
anticompetitive and exactly the harm the antitrust laws aim 
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to prevent,' no special care need be taken in assigning 
inferences to circumstantial evidence." Alvord-Polk, 37 F.3d 
at 1001 (quoting Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 478). 
 
With these standards in mind, we will address the 
evidence adduced by Rossi in support of his theory of 
conspiracy. Cognizant of our obligation to view the evidence 
as a whole and to resist the temptation to 
compartmentalize it, see Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1230, we 
will nonetheless consider Rossi's allegations, defendant by 
defendant, to provide a logical structure to our analysis. We 
note in this regard that this court has been relatively 
hospitable to the efforts of plaintiffs to prove concerted 
action. See Alvord-Polk, 37 F.3d at 1010, 1013; Petruzzi's, 
998 F.2d at 1247; Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1380, 1383; 
Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Budd Baer, Inc., 826 F.2d 1335, 
1338-39 (3d Cir. 1987); Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General 
Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 572-75 (3d Cir. 1986); Tunis 
Bros., 763 F.2d at 1489, 1502. 
 
2. Rossi's Evidence of Concerted Action  
 
       a. Standard (Robert Higginson, William Higginson, 
       Joseph Licciardello) and Arzee (Al Roth and Cary Roth)10 
 
We begin with Rossi's horizontal competitors, Standard 
and Arzee, against whom Rossi has the strongest evidence 
of motive to keep a price-cutting competitor with close ties 
to many customers from entering the market. Standard's 
and Arzee's (as well as the other defendants') first line of 
defense to Rossi's charges is that the conspiracy he alleges 
is implausible, and therefore under Matsushita, permitting 
an inference of antitrust conspiracy would have the effect of 
"chill[ing] the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed 
to protect." 475 U.S. at 594. According to the defendants, 
there was no rational economic reason for them to conspire, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. In our discussion of Standard, Robert Higginson, William Higginson, 
Joseph Licciardello, and also Arzee, Alvin Roth, and Cary Roth, we find 
no basis to separate the individual defendants from their respective 
corporate employers. Thus, for shorthand purposes, when we make 
future reference to "Standard" or "Arzee," (or the "Standard defendants" 
and the "Arzee defendants"), we refer to the individuals as well as the 
corporate entities with which they are related. 
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and thus they had no plausible motive to conspire to 
boycott Rossi. 
 
They base their implausibility claim on the fact that the 
market was extremely price competitive and consisted of 
upwards of three dozen competing distributors. Under 
these conditions, defendants argue that they could not have 
charged above-market prices and stayed in business, and 
thus that they had nothing to fear from a price-cutter like 
Rossi. Moreover, they submit that there would be little to 
gain by excluding one more distributor from the market 
when there were at least three dozen firms in the market 
already. In defendants' view, any conspiracy to stabilize the 
market and reap enhanced profits would be doomed to 
failure (and is therefore presumably implausible) because, 
to succeed, it would have required an enormously complex 
and far-reaching undertaking, involving upwards of sixty 
participants (each selling different quantities of comparable, 
competing products) to stabilize prices at supra-competitive 
levels. Defendants maintain that, because there was 
virtually no likelihood that three (Standard, Arzee, and 
Allied) out of the almost forty competing distributors, and 
one or two (GAF and possibly Wood Fiber) out of thirty 
manufacturers could have sustained such a conspiracy, 
they had no rational motive to conspire, and the conspiracy 
is thus implausible. 
 
The defendants compare this to the situation in 
Matsushita. There, the defendants were alleged to have 
entered into a twenty-plus-year conspiracy to fix prices in 
the electronics market below the market level in the hopes 
of establishing a monopoly and extracting monopoly profits 
in the undetermined future. See Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 
588-90. The Court viewed this predatory pricing scheme as 
implausible because it would have required multiple 
defendants to endure tremendous up-front losses for the 
foreseeable future in the hopes that they could, at some 
point, recover these losses and make even greater profits 
once they had driven their competitors from the market and 
established a monopoly. See id. at 589-90. The Court, 
examining the electronics market as well as the length and 
ongoing failure of the alleged conspiracy, concluded that 
there was no evidence that the defendants could ever 
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recoup such losses, see id. at 594-95, and therefore, that 
the defendants had no motive to engage in the conspiracy. 
See id. at 595. 
 
Standard's and Arzee's reliance on Matsushita in this 
case is misplaced for several reasons. As a threshold 
matter, Matsushita does not apply when there is direct 
evidence of conspiracy. See Petruzzi's, 998 F.2d at 1233. 
Here, Rossi has adduced direct evidence of concerted action 
between defendants Standard and Arzee in the form of a 
threat Rossi received in December of 1988. Joseph 
Licciardello, who had by that time left his job at GAF and 
was working in Rossi's old job as manager of the Standard 
branch at Cedar Knolls, told Rossi that Standard and Arzee 
would do whatever it took to put him out of business if he 
persisted with his plans to found Rossi Florence. In his 
deposition, Rossi testified: 
 
       Q: Mr. Rossi, tell me specifically what anyone from 
       Standard did to prevent Rossi Florence from going into 
       business. 
 
       * * *  
 
       A: I guess it started when Joe Licciardello came over 
       and threatened me that if I went into business that he 
       and Arzee Supply would do anything they could, stop 
       supplies, cut the prices, whatever they had to do they 
       were going to do to keep me out of business. That's the 
       way he put it.11 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Arzee argues that this statement is not admissible against it under 
Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987). We conclude that it is. 
Under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), "a statement by a coconspirator of a 
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy" is not 
inadmissible hearsay as to that party. Under our jurisprudence, four 
requirements must be met before a statement can be admitted under 
this exception. "It must appear: (1) that a conspiracy existed; (2) the 
declarant and the party against whom the statement is offered were 
members of the conspiracy; (3) the statement was made in the course of 
the conspiracy; and (4) the statement was made in furtherance of the 
conspiracy." United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 333 (3d Cir. 1992). 
The district court must find these requirements by a preponderance of 
the evidence. See Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175; McGlory, 968 F.2d at 333. 
The district court made no such finding here. It did not even address the 
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Licciardello's threat, viewed in a light most favorable to 
Rossi, indicates that two of his competitors had discussed 
and agreed to act jointly to prevent Rossi from competing 
with them in the roofing and siding business in northern 
New Jersey. Moreover, Licciardello's statement even details 
how the two companies planned to do it; they agreed to 
"stop supplies" anyway they could. Thus, we conclude that 
the Matsushita implausible conspiracy argument is not 
relevant to the allegations of conspiracy with respect to 
Standard and Arzee. However, even if, as in the case of 
GAF, there was no direct evidence of concerted action, the 
conspiracy Rossi alleges is not implausible. Indeed, as we 
will discuss below, with respect to Standard, Arzee, and 
GAF, the conspiracy makes perfect sense. See infra 
S II.B.2.b(1). 
 
The direct evidence discussed above is enough to take the 
case against Standard and Arzee beyond the constraints of 
Matsushita (and thus permits us to avoid the questions 
whether the circumstantial evidence tends to exclude the 
possibility of independent action, whether the plaintiff 's 
claim is plausible, and whether the defendants' economic 
motives were rational). See supra at S II.B.1. However, it is 
not enough by itself to satisfy Rossi's burden in opposing 
summary judgment. On the other hand, Rossi has adduced 
a significant collection of other evidence, circumstantial in 
nature, in support of his position. We turn to that evidence 
now. 
 
First, Rossi has adduced evidence of two meetings 
between Standard and Arzee employees which, when taken 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
issue, concluding, as a matter of law, that no conspiracy existed. Thus, 
the question whether there is sufficient evidence to permit such a finding 
is subject to plenary review. See McGlory 968 F.2d at 334. 
 
As will be made clear in the discussion that follows, the record is 
replete with circumstantial evidence that Licciardello, Standard, and 
Arzee were members of a conspiracy to boycott Rossi and drive him out 
of business. See infra S II.B.2.a. As the record also shows, 
Licciardello's 
threat was made during the conspiracy and in furtherance of it. We 
conclude therefore that Rossi has satisfied the preponderance standard 
with respect to all four requirements. 
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together, support the inference of a joint motive by the two 
defendants to unlawfully stabilize roofing prices in northern 
New Jersey. This motive is consistent with the motive 
behind the defendants' alleged boycott of Rossi Florence 
and Rossi Roofing -- that Standard and Arzee wanted to 
eliminate an uncooperative competitor who threatened to 
undercut their prices and destabilize the market. Rossi 
testified that sometime in 1986 or 1987, while he was still 
working for Standard (he was fired in September 1989), his 
boss at that time and chairman of Standard, Robert 
Higginson, directed him to attend a lunch with Al and Cary 
Roth of Arzee. According to Rossi, Robert Higginson told 
him that this lunch had been set up so that the two 
competitors could "cooperate" and share price information. 
Robert Higginson also told Rossi that Standard's other 
competitors had pricing agreements and that they were the 
only ones who were not participating. At the lunch, Al Roth 
proposed to Rossi a price-fixing scheme whereby Arzee and 
Standard would fix prices and divide up their large 
customers and jobs. Al Roth further explained to Rossi that 
he had maintained a similar arrangement with Allied 
concerning Certainteed products. Rossi rejected Al Roth's 
overtures, and Standard and Arzee did not, at that time, 
enter into an agreement to set prices. 
 
The second Standard-Arzee meeting at which prices were 
discussed took place over the telephone in February of 
1990. It involved a conversation between Licciardello, the 
manager at that time of Standard's Cedar Knolls branch, 
and Cary Roth, the manager of one of Arzee's local 
branches, regarding the price of GAF vinyl siding. Patrick 
Mulcahy, a former employee of Standard who overheard the 
conversation, recalled that Licciardello said to Cary Roth: 
"We really got to run this like a business and we all have 
to make a profit here. And we've got to keep certain price 
levels in order to do this."12 This statement is remarkably 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Standard and Arzee both raise questions about whether this 
conversation actually took place. In addition to denying it, they point 
out 
that Mulcahy did not hear the voice of the person on the phone, and 
only heard Licciardello talking to someone named "Cary." Mulcahy 
assumed the person on the other end of the line was Cary Roth. As this 
is before us on a motion for summary judgment, we conclude that, in a 
light most favorable to Rossi, a jury could infer that "Cary" was Cary 
Roth of Arzee. 
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similar to other statements that we have found probative of 
an agreement between competitors. See, e.g., Petruzzi's, 
998 F.2d at 1236 ("[W]hy don't you put your prices in line 
and make money on what you have?"). 
 
Neither of these discussions took place during the period 
of the alleged conspiracy to boycott and exclude Rossi from 
the market; one took place before, and one after. Yet we 
reject Standard's and Arzee's contention that they are 
irrelevant to our decision. The two pieces of evidence, 
especially taken together, are probative of Standard's and 
Arzee's motive. Evidence that Standard's and Arzee's 
principals had actively considered fixing prices and 
allocating customers in 1986-87, and again in 1990, is 
sufficient to permit the inference that Standard and Arzee 
may have had a long-standing intent to stabilize prices in 
the roofing distribution business in northern New Jersey. 
See Big Apple BMW, 974 F.2d at 1360-61 (reviewing 
evidence outside of the statute of limitations and thus not 
part of the alleged conspiracy which nevertheless 
"demonstrat[ed] a pattern of conduct"); see also Andersen v. 
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 483-84 (1976) (proof of similar 
acts is admissible to show intent or the absence of 
mistake); Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 207- 
08 (1973) (citing the well-settled evidentiary principle that 
" `the prior doing of other similar acts, whether clearly a 
part of a scheme or not, is useful as reducing the 
possibility that the act in question was done with innocent 
intent.' ") (quoting 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence 200 (3d ed. 
1940)). Because Rossi was known to the defendants as a 
price-cutter and potent competitor who had refused to 
collude on prices in the past, this circumstantial evidence 
tends to link Standard's and Arzee's motives with their 
other actions in support of the boycott, which are detailed 
below. 
 
The record is also replete with examples of high pressure 
recruitment, monitoring, and enforcement tactics 
undertaken by Standard and Arzee in furtherance of their 
efforts to prevent Rossi from purchasing roofing materials, 
particularly GAF product. There is evidence that Standard 
and Arzee put pressure on virtually everyone, including 
manufacturers, distributors, and even Rossi's prospective 
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business partner, Droesch, to convince them not to do 
business with Rossi. In December 1988, for example, Al 
Roth called Droesch, who had agreed to establish Rossi 
Florence and go into business with Rossi, and told him that 
he was not happy about Rossi competing against Arzee and 
that if Droesch proceeded with his plans to establish Rossi 
Florence with Rossi, Roth would open up an Arzee location 
on Long Island near Droesch's Florence business which 
was located there. Also in late 1988 and early 1989, 
representatives of several manufacturers told Rossi that 
they were being pressured not to deal with him or sell to 
Rossi Florence. Specifically, Rossi testified that 
representatives from Gold Bond, Wood Fiber, Bird 
Corporation, Homosote, Hi-Finn, Genstar, Vipco, and 
Hastings Aluminum, told him that they had been 
threatened by representatives of Standard. Similarly, 
representatives of Nailite and Certainteed claimed that they 
had been threatened by Arzee.13 
 
There was evidence that after Rossi incorporated Rossi 
Roofing in early 1989, Standard's and Arzee's pressure on 
manufacturers and distributors continued. Joe Mullenhour 
of Bird Corporation told Rossi that Licciardello of Standard 
had threatened to drop Bird's vinyl siding if Bird 
Corporation sold to Rossi Roofing. Bill Higginson of 
Standard also spoke to Raymond Six of Gold Bond and told 
him that he was "disappointed" that Gold Bond had agreed 
to sell to Rossi Roofing. Six cut off the conversation because 
he was concerned by the antitrust implications of Bill 
Higginson's overtures. More specifically, Six told Higginson 
that he would not let the conversation go further because: 
 
       Gold Bond had been in an anti-trust suit back in the 
       70's on gypsum. Every Gold Bond manager - well, I'll 
       say every Gold Bond employee had been schooled, I'll 
       say, from 1975 on, anyway, on what Robinson-Patman 
       is, what Sherman anti-trust was. So the conversation 
       wasn't going to go any further than what my statement 
       to him was. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. While offered in hearsay form, we will consider these statements 
because they are capable of being admissible at trial, see Petruzzi's, 998 
F.2d at 1234 n.9 (citations omitted), for Rossi has simply to produce the 
declarants to give the testimony. Id. 
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When Rossi asked Jim Hines of Hi-Finn to supply Rossi 
Roofing with the "Atlas" insulation line, he arranged for 
Rossi to buy the product indirectly through a middleman at 
a higher price. When Hines later visited Standard on a 
sales call, Licciardello told him, "You know why I can't do 
business with you." Hines replied that "if it has anything to 
do with the truck of Atlas insulation that Joe Rossi has in 
stock, that was purchased through another distributor, not 
directly through Atlas." Licciardello referred Hines to Bob 
Schaab, Standard's Controller, who told Hines to"[d]o what 
you want to." Based upon his experience with Schaab and 
his dealings with Standard, Hines testified that he 
concluded that conversation with "the feeling that his 
implication may have been that, if I sold to Joe [Rossi], he 
definitely wouldn't buy from me." Finally, Hines testified 
that his business with Standard fell off right around the 
time that Rossi purchased the Atlas insulation from the 
middleman recommended by Hines. On this evidence, a fact 
finder could reasonably draw the inference that Licciardello 
had threatened Hines to ensure Hi-Finn's cooperation in 
the boycott of Rossi, and that, when Hines rebuffed him, 
Standard punished Hines and Atlas by cutting off future 
purchases. 
 
Similarly, Rick Fiore, an employee of roofing 
manufacturer Certainteed, told Rossi that Cary Roth of 
Arzee had pressured him and threatened to sue Certainteed 
if it sold to Rossi Roofing. Robert Qualik of Nailite informed 
Rossi that Arzee had told Nailite not to sell to Rossi Roofing 
and that "[Arzee] had blocked [Rossi Roofing] from getting 
product on a particular job right around the corner from 
us." Also, Karl Loser of Wood Fiber told Rossi that he was 
receiving a lot of pressure from Standard not to sell 
Structodek FS, a Wood Fiber product, to Rossi Roofing. 
 
In an effort to circumvent these supply problems arising 
from his efforts to buy directly from manufacturers, Rossi 
attempted to purchase product through other distributors, 
even though this would cost more. For example, Rossi was 
able to convince Passaic Metals, a roofing and siding 
distributor in northern New Jersey, to sell him some GAF 
product. In response, Bill Higginson of Standard called his 
competitor, Frank Gurtman, the president of Passaic 
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Metals, and threatened to open a branch near Passaic 
Metals and take away all of his customers if Gurtman 
continued to sell to Rossi. 
 
There is also evidence that Standard and Arzee went to 
great lengths to monitor Rossi Roofing. The record indicates 
that Licciardello ordered Keith Cogley and Jorge Esteves to 
report to him the comings and goings of all roofing 
materials at Rossi Roofing. All three closely watched Rossi's 
premises on a daily basis to determine what kinds of 
products Rossi was able to purchase and from where they 
might be coming. Cary Roth and Ed Jacobitz of Arzee also 
frequently monitored Rossi Roofing by sitting in their cars 
in a cul-de-sac adjacent to Rossi's premises. 
 
In addition, there is evidence that Standard even reported 
back to GAF when its employees saw GAF product on 
Rossi's premises to assist GAF in enforcing the boycott. 
Former GAF district manager Licciardello, then working for 
Standard, admitted that after seeing GAF product on 
Rossi's premises, he called Bob Gessner of GAF to confirm 
that GAF was still not selling to Rossi. On another 
occasion, when a load of GAF was sitting out in front of 
Rossi Roofing, Gessner said to Licciardello, "I thought we 
weren't selling him," to which Licciardello responded "we're 
not." 
 
When Standard's Cogley saw a load of GAF product at 
Rossi Roofing, Licciardello called GAF to find out how Rossi 
had procured the product. Someone at GAF told 
Licciardello that the load was not for Rossi Roofing, but 
that it was being transported on a Jentar truck, and was 
simply stopping overnight at 8 East Frederick Place, where 
both Jentar Trucking and Rossi Roofing had offices. Later, 
after Licciardello learned that Rossi Roofing had purchased 
GAF product from Servistar through his Far Hills account, 
see infra S II.B.2.c, Licciardello told Standard employee 
Esteves that " `That's the last time we're going to be seeing 
any GAF across the street.' They got the -- they were 
getting the loads through [Far Hills], which is [Servistar]. 
That's how Joe Rossi was getting GAF and he's 
[Licciardello's] going to put an end to that. `Never going to 
see another GAF load across the street.' " 
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While this monitoring and reporting activity would not in 
isolation be probative of a conspiracy, in the context of the 
pressure and enforcement tactics described above, the 
direct evidence that Standard and Arzee had talked about 
and agreed to boycott Rossi Florence and Rossi Roofing, 
and the circumstantial evidence of motive, certain 
inferences can be drawn from this evidence. To enforce a 
boycott, Standard and Arzee would need to monitor 
carefully the supplies Rossi was able to procure, 
communicate to cooperating manufacturers any evidence 
that Rossi had been able to circumvent the boycott, and 
bring pressure on any non-cooperating manufacturers or 
distributors that refused to participate in the conspiracy. 
Here, Rossi has adduced evidence of exclusive monitoring 
by both Standard and Arzee, and evidence that Licciardello 
could "put an end" to Rossi receiving GAF product. Viewed 
in conjunction with the evidence that Standard and Arzee 
pressured many manufacturers and distributors, this 
monitoring and reporting activity also supports an inference 
that Rossi's two primary competitors were jointly 
attempting to establish a market-wide boycott of Rossi 
Roofing. 
 
We emphasize that we would not consider the evidence 
that Standard and Arzee aggressively monitored Rossi 
Roofing (and even reported the substance of those 
observations to GAF), without more, sufficient to satisfy 
Rossi's burden in opposing summary judgment. However, 
in conjunction with all of the other pieces of circumstantial 
evidence Rossi has adduced, we believe that this monitoring 
and reporting activity represents an important thread to be 
considered in the complicated tapestry of conspiracy that 
Rossi weaves. 
 
Looking at all of the evidence Rossi has assembled 
against Standard and Arzee, we conclude that he has 
satisfied his burden in opposing summary judgment on the 
concerted action prong. First, Rossi has developed direct 
evidence that Standard and Arzee had, both before and 
after Rossi Roofing existed, attempted to conspire to fix 
prices, allocate customers, and otherwise stabilize the 
roofing and siding distribution market in northern New 
Jersey. He has also shown that both defendants knew him 
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to be a price-cutting competitor who had frustrated their 
unlawful purposes by refusing to cooperate with them. 
These two facts provide strong evidence of the defendants' 
motive to conspire against Rossi. Desiring to raise prices 
above their competitive levels in a highly competitive 
market, an inference is supported that Standard and Arzee 
were concerned that they could not succeed without Rossi's 
cooperation, and that they therefore decided to prevent him 
from competing against them. 
 
Next, Rossi points us to direct evidence of the boycott, 
namely Licciardello's threat on behalf of Standard and 
Arzee to cut off his supplies and put him out of business. 
Finally, Rossi has developed considerable evidence of 
Standard's and Arzee's elaborate efforts to enforce the 
boycott. Rossi has produced testimony that many 
manufacturers and distributors were pressured and/or 
threatened not to do business with Rossi Florence and 
Rossi Roofing. He has also adduced testimony that 
Standard and Arzee had an elaborate monitoring system in 
place, one which even included reporting back to GAF to 
help enforce the boycott. 
 
To be sure, this evidence is far from conclusive. It could 
be found at trial that Standard, Arzee, and GAF were all 
acting independently of one another in parallel efforts to do 
Rossi in. However, given the comprehensive nature of the 
evidence covering all elements of the group boycott Rossi 
alleges, we must reverse the district court's order granting 
summary judgment in favor of Standard, Arzee, Robert 
Higginson, William Higginson, the Roths, and Licciardello. 
 
       b. GAF 
 
We also believe that Rossi has adduced sufficient 
evidence that GAF acted in concert with Standard and 
Arzee to survive its motion for summary judgment and will 
reverse the district court with respect to GAF as well. 
 
        (1) Matsushita Implausibility 
 
GAF's first defense, like Standard's and Arzee's, is that 
the conspiracy alleged by Rossi is implausible under 
Matsushita. Because Licciardello's statement that Standard 
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and Arzee intended to establish a boycott of Rossi Roofing 
is insufficient by itself to hold in GAF, and we can find no 
(other) direct evidence of GAF 's participation in the alleged 
conspiracy in the record, we must analyze, under the 
Matsushita standard, the plausibility of the conspiracy that 
Rossi alleges. See supra S II.B.2.a. In contrast with that 
case, we find that the theory Rossi advances with respect to 
GAF 's motivations and participation in the conspiracy is 
not economically implausible. 
 
First, Rossi's claim does not, as defendants allege, 
require the cooperation of dozens of distributors and 
manufacturers (each selling different quantities of 
comparable competing products) in the northern New 
Jersey marketplace to succeed (i.e. for distributors 
Standard, Arzee, and Allied to be able to charge supra- 
competitive prices). Rather, it is primarily focused on the 
actions of three distributors, Standard, Arzee, and Allied, 
and one manufacturer, GAF. Despite the fact that this case 
arises against the backdrop of the highly competitive, price- 
sensitive roofing and siding industry in northern New 
Jersey in 1989 and 1990, Rossi advances a plausible theory 
of how these defendants could have unlawfully conspired to 
fix prices and therefore why they would want to boycott 
Rossi. Moreover, even if Standard and Arzee were not 
conspiring to keep prices artificially inflated by pocketing 
the secret rebates that their competitors were not receiving, 
both still had a plausible motive to keep Rossi, an avowed 
and experienced price-cutter and acknowledged potent 
competitor with a reputation among their customers for 
excellent service, from opening up a competing 
distributorship next door. 
 
In order to comprehend the plausibility of the conspiracy 
Rossi alleges, it is necessary to understand GAF's position 
in the market and the importance of GAF product. In 1990, 
GAF was indisputably one of the largest and most 
important manufacturers of roofing supplies in the 
northern New Jersey market, with an estimated 38% share 
of the entire residential roofing shingle market in New 
Jersey and an estimated 71% share of the residential 
roofing laminate shingle market in New Jersey. GAF not 
only supplied a large percentage of the overall market, but 
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it also was Standard's single largest supplier during the 
time that Rossi was a manager there. As such, Rossi was 
extremely familiar with GAF, and a large percentage of his 
customers, many of whom followed him from Standard to 
Rossi Roofing, had a strong preference for GAF product. 
Indeed, there is substantial testimony in the record from 
many sources supporting Rossi's contention that GAF 
product was critical to both Rossi Florence's and Rossi 
Roofing's success in the market. 
 
For example, Sean Coffey, one of the five largest 
residential roofers in northern New Jersey, testified that he 
used GAF product in 1989 and 1990 almost exclusively and 
would not buy from any roofing distributor that did not 
have access to it. Similarly, Francis Doherty, proprietor of 
another large roofing business in northern New Jersey, 
testified that "99 percent" of his strip shingle purchases 
had been GAF product. John Feher, another roofer who 
attempted to purchase GAF product from Rossi Roofing, 
testified that GAF was very popular with everyone, 
including contractors and homeowners, because "it's easy 
to get and guarantees [sic] and everything is good on it." 
Thomas Harnett, an executive at Bird Corporation, testified 
that GAF "dominated all levels of roofing in New Jersey," 
and that it was a "highly desirable product." 
 
Likewise, Albert Logan, a former Celotex employee, stated 
that GAF had "dominate[d] the market for years," 
representing at least fifty percent of every distributor's 
inventory. John Mulcahy, a former Standard employee, also 
testified that GAF was "dominant and had . . . [its] 
product[s] so well-established in the area." Because of this, 
Mulcahy stated that any distributor denied access to GAF 
product would have difficulty competing in the residential 
shingle market. Id. When asked to describe the magnitude 
of the adverse impact of trying to compete without GAF 
product, Mulcahy stated, "It would be like a beer 
distributor not having Budweiser." 
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